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Abstract  
This article examines the binary of culture/religion/tradition and 
modern/secular/foreign and its impact on women’s human rights struggles 
in particular in northern Nigeria. This binary is commonly perpetuated by 
state and non-state actors, including politicians, community leaders and 
religious leaders, who weaponise culture, religion and tradition to resist 
the struggle for gender equality. It highlights how progress around some 
concerns, such as rape of young girls, has occurred concurrently with 
attacks on other rights, particularly sexual and reproductive rights 
including abortion and sex outside marriage, and of those with non-
normative sexual orientations, gender identities and gender expressions. 
This hardening of attitudes and narrowing of what is seen as permissible 
not only obscures the diversity of how people lived and thought in the past 
but is also far from the reality of how people live their lives presently. It 
further reflects the increased influence of religious fundamentalism and 
conservatism in northern Nigeria.2  
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Introduction 
I write this article based on my work as a feminist, human rights and 
peacebuilding activist, researcher and practitioner in Nigeria. Although 
born in Nigeria, I left the country as a child, and returned in 2013. Not only 
am I not Nigerian but I was also not raised in either Christian or Muslim 
traditions, with my knowledge of both the result of activism, social 
networks, study and work rather than lived experience. To inform this 
article, I draw on three strands of work and activism: with human rights, 
peace and women’s rights activists in five northern states (Borno, Kaduna, 
Kano, Plateau and Yobe) on conflict management and peacebuilding; 
research and work with communities in the conflict affected northeast; 
and collecting queer women’s narratives for a book entitled She Called Me 
Woman: Nigeria’s Queer Women Speak, which aims to address 
dehumanisation and change public discourse. It is challenging for me to 
write on this subject. Not only do I continue to live and work in northeast 
Nigeria where there is limited space to discuss these issues, but I count 
many activists whose attitudes I challenge and critique below as good 
friends with whom I have worked closely for human rights, including those 
of women, justice and peace for many years.  
 
This article is divided into three sections. It first traces the genealogies of 
these binary framings. It then examines the ways these binaries draw on 
particular understandings of culture/ religion/ tradition and suppress 
other understandings and realities that existed in the past and are present 
today. It ends with examining how women’s rights activists mobilise and 
implications of these binaries on their activism. While women’s rights 
activists are strategic in engagement, their framework of mobilisation 
tends to be constrained by these binaries and the determination of the 
rights and rights-holders worthy of protection and advocacy. 
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Historicising the Binary 
The binary between culture/religion/tradition and modern/secular/ 
foreign has historical roots in northern Nigeria, a region seen as an Islamic 
monolith but which has large numbers of Christians, the continued 
(hidden) presence of Maguzawa, followers of indigenous Hausa religions, 
as well as those who do not believe. As will be explained below, over time, 
culture/religion/tradition came to be linked with justice, morality and 
effectiveness governance and in opposition to the modern/secular/foreign 
which became associated with corruption, injustice, immorality and 
predatory governance. 
 
The arrival of Islam and the Sokoto Caliphate 
Islam first came to and was spread in West Africa through trade, patronage 
and conversion by elites (Ubah, 2001). In the land now known as northern 
Nigeria, there was a vibrant Bori culture before Islamisiation with keen 
understanding of medicinal herbs, the role of music in worship and 
importance of dance in connecting with the divine. The ruler of the Kanem 
Bornu Empire converted to Islam in the 11th century and rulers of the 
Hausa kingdoms following suit from the 14th or 15th centuries onwards 
(Ubah, 2001). In the late 18th century, the Fulani scholar Uthman dan Fodio 
and his followers declared war on the Hausa kingdoms to standardise 
Islam and align ‘Hausaland eastward, namely within a wider Islamic 
civilizational complex whose centre was Arabia’ (Eltantawi, 2017), 
eliminating syncretic versions that had arisen over centuries. Dan Fodio 
seized on grievances against corrupt and unjust leaders, excessive 
taxation, elite decadence and the prohibition of veiling for women and 
turbans for men. Primarily a movement to reform supposedly ‘lax’ 
Muslims rather than convert ‘pagans’ (Last, 1979), the caliphate aimed to 
increase social morality in accordance with Islamic ideals through 
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education reforms, the development of markets and economic reforms 
and improved communications (Smith, 1971).  
 
Dan Fodio’s daughters played important literary and political roles, 
particularly Nana Asmau who was a leading scholar, teacher, historian and 
adviser to her brother when he succeeded to the caliphate. She was 
committed to women’s education, training a network of itinerant women 
teachers (jaji) whose objectives were conversion of women to Islam, 
education within Islam and harnessing of women’s talents in the service of 
the caliphate.  The jajis were symbols of the state and Islamic learning, held 
important and influential positions of power and were active in public 
discourse and debate. By training women, they integrated the newly 
conquered Maguzawa as well as the poor and those who lived in rural 
areas into caliphate practices and principles, their obligations as Muslims 
and what was seen as inappropriate behaviour (Mack and Boyd, 2000). 
Dan Fodio emphasised the importance of women leaders and women’s 
rights within Islamic frameworks but he also banned certain women’s 
hairstyles, tried to stop his wives going to market thereby setting a 
standard for seclusion as the marker of good Muslim households, closed 
houses to adult men and required women to pray separately from men in 
the mosque (Last, 2015).  
 
Sinikangas (2004) has argued that increasing restrictions on public, 
political and economic roles of women after the jihad encouraged some 
women to turn to Bori, which was prohibited with performance punishable 
by death (Mustapha, 2018). Despite its repression, Bori has survived 
because ‘it has a firm gendered base among women in Hausa society, it 
offers valuable psycho-medical services, and it is flexible and adaptable by 
nature’ (Mustapha, 2018).  
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The death of dan Fodio in 1817 saw gradual return to pre-jihad practices, 
forming the basis for later calls for reform and revivalism (Mustapha, 
2015a). There was dissidence as regimes failed to live up to expectations 
(Last, 2015) but in popular narratives among northern Muslims today, the 
caliphate is presented as a time of high levels of religiosity, morality and 
good governance. However, while Nana Asmau is remembered, the role 
of women more broadly in governance and expansion is all but written 
out. Thus, the binary, pitting ‘universalised’ Islamic practices and values 
and improved governance against other customs and beliefs, including a 
plurality of Islamic interpretations, syncretic practices as well as more 
indigenous belief systems, first became apparent.  
 
The caliphate created and solidified links between governance according 
to Islamic law, morality and effective and just rule as opposed to the 
corruption of the ‘state’ i.e. the rulers of the Hausa kingdoms who were 
seen to be inauthentic followers of Islam interested only in themselves. 
This narrative decentres the experiences of those who resisted the 
caliphate’s political and religious control, the Magazuwa and others 
subject to enslavement and slave raids and the scaling back of reforms and 
continuation of many aspects of pre-jihad inequality, especially after the 
death of dan Fodio (Mustapha et al., 2018; Kendhammer, 2016; Smith, 
1954). However, even in present-day discourse around Shari’a codes, it 
remains difficult to focus on contemporary events rather than the 
caliphate which continues to loom large in ‘political and symbolic 
influence’ and remains a ‘mythologised moment, an idealised reminder of 
what’s possible through Shari’a, and a (potentially) plausible template for 
the modern Nigerian state’ (Kendhammer 2016, p. 52). 
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Conquest and colonisation 
The defeat of the caliphate by the British Empire in 1903 added the 
influence and actions of ‘outsiders’ to the nascent binary. Colonisation did 
not fundamentally change the nature of who held power with 
administrative structures recycled to facilitate indirect rule and local elites 
imbued ‘with formal and legal authority while the colonial state drew on 
their social and religious legitimacy’ (Hoffmann, 2014).3 Conquest led to 
emirs with enhanced powers but seeking to buttress their Islamic 
legitimacy, the ulama divided in attitudes towards the impact of 
colonialisation on Islam and whether to call for opposition, 
accommodation or passive resistance and ordinary people confused by 
foreign rule and sectarian divisions (Mustapha et al., 2018).  
 
The infusing of colonial power into caliphate structures caused problems 
for non-Hausa/Fulani and/or non-Muslim communities and increased 
conversion to Christianity (Hoffmann, 2014). A retired civil servant and 
historian whose grandfather was one of the first Christian priests in Gwoza 
in northeast Borno state talks about there being a contest for souls during 
this time (personal communication). Missionaries set up schools, dividing 
Islamic forms of education from what became seen as ‘western’ 
education. Consequently, the word boko, which had originally meant 
fraud, sham, inauthentic or hoodwinking, came to be equated with the 
latter form of education, connoting ‘a feeling that colonial schools could 
mislead Muslims into accepting false knowledge’ (Thurston 2017, p. 15). 
In contemporary times, it has come to mean westernised people and elites 
and western style frameworks, culture, institutions and education 
(Thurston, 2017). Piety and rates of seclusion among Muslims, thinking this 
was necessary for Allah to rid northern Nigeria of Christians, increased 
(Last, 2015). These dynamics reinforced the earlier binary into which 
narratives of corrupted governance due to foreign influence became 
infused. 
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From independence to democracy 
While independence movements rose in southern Nigeria in the early 
twentieth century, northern elites resisted independence due to fears of 
marginalisation within a democratic dispensation due to educational, 
social and economic disadvantages relative to southern Nigeria. Religion 
(Islam) and identity politics (northernisation) were invoked to prevent 
southern Christian domination replacing European domination 
(Mustapha, 2018). Many northern Muslims suspected outside influences, 
saw modernisation as constituting unacceptable innovations to Islam and 
were resentful or ambivalent to secular forms of governance with a 
stronger religious sense of identity replacing ethnic or local identities 
(Hoffmann, 2014).  
 
The post-independence state, structured around colonial administration 
with state symbols, the working week and governance style based on a 
secular Western model, was resented by many Muslims as ‘Christian’ 
(Clarke and Linden, 1984). While most Muslims could accept this model, 
this attitude began to change by the 1970s as the ‘growing moral, political 
and economic crisis of the state’ was identified with the failure of the 
imported secular western model (Mustapha, 2015a p. 10-11). The Iranian 
revolution was a galvanising influence for many young Muslims who 
believed ‘Western impositions must be cast off, pious Muslims must rule 
and Shari’a must be the law of the land’ (Ostien, 2018) and looked back to 
the earlier caliphate and jihad as solutions (Kendhammer, 2016). This 
period saw influence and financial support from groups in Saudi Arabia, 
Libya, Sudan and Iran changing religious discourse. It also saw 
diversification and fragmentation of religious affiliation (Mustapha and 
Bunza, 2015) and sectarian violence (Ostien, 2018). The duty to command 
right and forbid wrong aggravated sectarian intolerance, resulting in 
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‘perpetration of subversive violence or the invasion of individual privacy in 
the course of allegedly doing ‘God’s work’’ (Mustapha 2015a, p. 9).4  
 
Here, we start to see increasing religious intolerance and fundamentalism, 
attacks on different religious interpretations and the further narrowing of 
actions and beliefs seen as permissible superimposed onto previous binary 
framings. The binary deepened with democratic transition in 1999 after 
decades of military rule mixed with intermittent civilian rule. Many people 
reflecting on this time speak of the shady nature and political thuggery of 
electoral mobilisation, continued impunity for leaders and corruption with 
‘the coming of politics’ which further increased disappointment with and 
alienation from democratic governance. For many, democracy continues 
to be connected with secularism with both overlaid onto Nigeria political 
problems whereas a return to Islamic governance is seen as meaning 
justice, morality and effective governance.  
 
The institution and implementation of Shari’a codes 
Shortly after the democratic transition in 1999, northern states, starting 
from Zamfara, instituted Shari’a codes against a backdrop of supportive 
protests with ‘Shari’a’ seen as a solution to corruption, injustice, poverty, 
unemployment and inequality (Hoffmann, 2014; Eltantawi, 2017) and an 
‘oppressive denial of the diversity of thought’ (Uwais, 2004) in the 
development of these Shari’a codes.5  A survey conducted in 2000 shows 
that Shari’a codes were unpopular nationally with only 38 percent of 
Nigerians approving of Zamfara’s actions but, although 33 percent of 
Muslims said the federal government should have intervened more 
forcefully to prevent Zamfara from implementing Shari’a, this was popular 
in states with large Muslim majorities (Kendhammer, 2016). Politicians 
seized on Shari’a codes to mobilise the electorate and win votes. These 
moves were a reaction to the transition, in particular power in the hands 
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of a southern President, reawakening fears of northern marginalisation in 
a democratic dispensation (Hoffmann, 2014). Many Muslims looked for a 
symbolic northern identity and effective and just governance and Shari’a 
codes provided both.  
 
However, despite pockets of effective implementation (Mustapha et al., 
2018), the institution of Shari’a codes has not met these high expectations. 
People talk of ‘political Shari’a’ to describe the insincerity of politicians, 
pointing to how institution of Shari’a codes has become embroiled within 
the same corrupt political process that had sparked their demand 
(Eltantawi, 2017; Kendhammer, 2016). While ‘Shari’a’ was failing to bring 
about fundamental and transformative change addressing poverty, 
inequality, corruption and injustice, there became increased emphasis on 
religious performativity and forms of ‘immorality.’ Women’s bodies 
became the way to demonstrate Shari’a’s effectiveness. Women’s 
sexuality increasingly was treated as a source of immorality. As Last (2015, 
p. 46) points out, ‘the way a community regulates its womenfolk becomes 
a marker for its concern for Islamic propriety.’ Karuwai (prostitutes) were 
warned to get married or leave states (Gaudio, 2009). Policies were passed 
to ‘save’ single and divorced women, seen as vulnerable to prostitution, 
including through mass wedding ceremonies and payment of dowries to 
men who came forward to marry them. Many women – Christians and 
Muslims alike – have told me of street harassment and admonitions by 
friends, family and neighbours to change their dressing to become ‘more 
modest.’ In one of the narratives I collected, IX refers to her university 
Muslim Students Society who policed Muslim women’s behaviour, 
stopping them from drinking alcohol, telling them not to live outside 
hostels as this would allow men to have access to them and threatening 
those dating men with exposure (Mohammed et al., 2018). Women were 
legally discriminated against with more women than men charged with 
and convicted of zina6 and different standards of evidence applied 
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(Pereira, 2005).7 Restrictions on sexuality are not confined to heterosexual 
women alone.  
 
While homosexuality, although not approved of, was seldom discussed in 
the public domain beforehand, it became part of political, media and 
public discourse around the passage of the Same Sex Marriage 
(Prohibition) Act 2014 with increased preaching against this particularly in 
churches, arrests, detention and disruption of parties and celebrations 
(Mohammed et al., 2018). Furthermore, the legacy of jihad prohibitions 
against Bori, which has a base of women practitioners as mentioned 
above, continues. There is discrimination and oppression against Bori 
groups, worshippers and those affiliated, with efforts at repression 
increasing post implementation of Shari’a codes, for example through 
prescription of the death penalty for participation in ‘pagan’ rites and 
prevention of gatherings (Mustapha, 2018).  
 
At every stage of Nigerian history, the development of the binary has been 
linked with governance. Since independence, the state has abrogated its 
responsibility, with the quality and availability of state infrastructure and 
services having noticeably declined in recent decades and religious 
institutions filling the gap.8 Often, religious leaders and institutions 
provide needed services and are the most accessible and available, with 
women in particular able to go to imams or pastors. Not surprisingly, 
religious institutions are often perceived to best work. Religious leaders 
are the actors that most people trust (Ehrhardt and Ibrahim, 2018; NSRP, 
2012). While this perception may be somewhat inflated given social 
pressures around religion, these findings show failures of all other 
institutions.  
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In response to this, there is increasing push from donors to work with 
religious and ‘traditional’ leaders seen as the power holders necessary to 
bring about change. Many women’s rights activists have always worked to 
influence these leaders. This approach can work.9 However, programmes 
sometimes skip out women’s rights activists or pursue parallel streams 
rather than hold interventions and leaders accountable to women 
mobilising for rights. This is problematic given these leaders are not known 
to be feminist allies and the limited possibility of one intervention 
changing this reality. This engagement can lead to perverse outcomes. A 
few years ago, I was facilitating a conflict analysis session when the 
representative of Jama’atu Nasrul Islam, an umbrella body for Muslim 
organisations, offered a potential solution to high incidence of gender-
based violence: to mobilise imams to preach about hudud punishments. 
He felt telling people Islam requires stoning for zina or hand amputation 
for theft would show the seriousness with which Allah took gender-based 
violence and corruption. While his sincerity is unquestioned, this story 
shows potential dangers of engaging with these leaders without thinking 
through interventions and making them accountable to feminists. 
 
As the institution of Shari’a codes has not brought about longed-for 
transformation, people have decreasing avenues to pursue within the 
current state frameworks. Around 2003, Mohammed Yusuf, the founder 
of Jama’atu Ahl al-Sunna li-l-Da‘wa wa-l-Jihad, commonly known as Boko 
Haram,10 started preaching that modern western education, democracy 
and government employment were religiously forbidden (Ostien, 2018). 
Protesting the corruption and inequality produced by state structures and 
calling for a return to a ‘purer’, more Islamic way of life, the group 
garnered substantial support among a population disenchanted with the 
fledgling democracy and failed Shari’a code institution. According to 
Mustapha (2015b), five inter-related factors are critical to understanding 
the group: religious doctrines; poverty and inequality (vertical and 
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horizontal);11 the political context of electoral competition post 
democratic transition in 1999; the geographical and international context; 
and personal agency of those involved. This binary between rule according 
to Islam as ensuring morality and effective and just governance in contrast 
to the secular Nigerian state corrupted by outside (foreign/non-
Muslim/southern) influences, the rise and normalisation of religious 
fundamentalism and failures of governance laid the framework for making 
the rise of jihadi armed groups possible. 
 
Cracks in the Binary 
Having traced genealogies of the binary, this section interrogates it. While 
much of its power is based on purported links to unchanging culture, 
religion and tradition, this obscures the multi-faceted nature and diversity 
of ways people lived in the past and present lived realities. Culture, religion 
and tradition are three different concepts seen as synonymous with 
combined symbolic weight weaponised against the rights of women and 
those of non-normative sexual orientations, gender identities and gender 
expressions. A common statement made by mostly men to justify gender 
inequality is ‘I am a traditional African’ with no understanding of the 
diversity of gender roles across the continent, within Nigeria or historical 
shifts. (Mohammed et al., 2018). After all, Christianity and Islam came to 
the region through processes of conquest and conversion and, in some 
areas, relatively recently, purposefully displacing indigenous religions in 
acts of cultural and physical violence than continue today. It is now 
considered deviant to even learn about Bori with all traditional religions 
seen as synonymous with devil worship (Nagarajan, 2016a). Moreover, 
with conservative and fundamentalist religious interpretations holding 
sway, we are witnessing deliberate erasure of culture, religion and 
tradition, including through a process of what Bennoune (2013) quotes 
Hassan Rachik as calling ‘Islamic globalisation’ displacing and de-
Nigerianising people’s lived Islams. Furthermore, rigid demarcation 
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between culture, religion and tradition and modern, secular and state 
breaks down given the nature of the polity. If secularism is separation 
between religion and the state, Nigeria is not a secular country but rather 
aims to treat Christianity and Islam equally. Moreover, many northern 
states, having instituted Shari’a codes, have integrated Islam into 
governance and administration of justice. Societal performativity of 
religion translates into requiring this of political and governing classes who 
are also close with religious leaders, with religious actors being important 
political players. The binary characterises the state as secular in opposition 
to culture/religion/tradition but this is not borne out by the reality. 
 
Binary framings also engage in historical erasure. They are used by those 
contesting women’s rights to perpetuate ideas of men as active leaders 
and decision makers and women as passive followers in the household and 
in public life (Voices for Change, 2015). However, northern Nigerian 
history includes women such as Nana Asmau, her sisters and the jaji 
mentioned above, the eight queens of Daura who were part of a 
matrilineal and matriarchal tradition, the warrior and military strategist 
Queen Amina of Zazzau, and Ya Magira Aisa Keli Ngermaramma who ruled 
the Kanem Bornu Empire for eight years.  
 
There has also been a considerable narrowing of what is considered 
permissible and acceptable when it comes to sexuality. Pereira (2005, p. 
55) shows the distinction between Shari’a codes and prevailing Hausa 
sexual culture as lived cultural practices in the context of ‘state-sponsored 
efforts by the Muslim religious right to reconstruct discourses of 
heterosexuality.’ Pereira (2005) writes of modern courtship including 
spending time in the potential bride’s house engaging in sexual intercourse 
to test compatibility and how these practices contrast with prosecutions 
for zina. She writes about tsarance, common in the early 20th century but 
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no longer practiced, where village groupings of girls and boys would 
engage in cuddling and sleeping together, and kawance or angwance, 
where friends of the bride or groom would gather for the wedding away 
from parents and have sexual freedoms with neither religious scholars nor 
anyone else condemning this practice. She quotes Asma’u Joda talking of 
older women in Adamawa state reminiscing about the past, saying they 
were ‘laughing at us. They said, “You people that now have the ‘real' Islam, 
your life has been destroyed.” They [the older women] used to enjoy 
themselves.’ (Pereira, 2005, p. 55.) 
 
Moreover, northern Nigeria’s long history of people of non-normative 
sexual orientations, gender identities and gender expressions is 
deliberately erased by Christian and Muslim conservatives and 
fundamentalists who paint these identities and practices as deviant, un-
Islamic/un-Christian, ‘un-African’ and ‘against our culture and religion’ 
(Mohammed et al., 2018). Actually, Hausa society has a ‘reputation for 
homosexuality’ in other parts of the country whose denial of people who 
engage in homosexual acts can be contrasted to Hausa people’s inclination 
to be more likely to gossip about than deny this (Gaudio, 2009). The ‘yan 
daudu are a ‘strictly distinctive social category of males who have adapted 
feminine mannerism, speech and dress’ (Sinikangas 2004, p 26). They do 
work seen as that done by women such as preparing and selling food, may 
or may not have sex and relationships with men who they refer to as miji 
(husband) and may get married to and have children with women (Gaudio, 
2009, 1998; John, 2016; Sinikangas, 2004). In the past, there were brothels 
for men of men and for women of women in northern Nigeria 
(Mohammed, Nagarajan and Aliyu, 2018). However, after implementation 
of Shari’a codes, many ‘yan daudu left ‘Shari’a states’ due to 
fundamentalist preaching and fear of attacks and violence (John, 2016) as 
well as rhetoric of the need to rid the state of ‘yan daudu to create ‘social 
conditions necessary for the full implementation of Shari’a’ and 
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‘improvement of public morality along Islamic lines’ which ‘would lead to 
justice and prosperity for all’ (Gaudio 2009, p. 23).   
 
Furthermore, while there is a strong social norm of men as household 
heads and breadwinners (Nagarajan, 2016b), this does not match reality. 
For example, in northeast Nigeria, violent conflict has forced women to 
assume new roles and decision-making power due to numbers of men 
killed, detained, disappeared, recruited or who have left the area 
(Nagarajan, 2017). Women have been responsible for saving the lives of 
men by hiding them and smuggling them to safety. Many households now 
are headed by women (Nagarajan, 2017). Even if men are present, their 
power has diminished due to inability or unwillingness to financially 
support the family, with women and girls having to earn incomes or 
acquire food, including through survival sex. Humanitarian and 
development actors hold discussions and consultation with women, try 
and address gender-based violence and mostly choose to distribute aid to 
women as this is more likely to reach the entire family. We are already 
seeing some backlash against these changes, with increasing incidence of 
violence against women and girls (VAWG), attempts to stop women talking 
of their actions to save men and imams and traditional leaders preaching 
against NGOs as changing culture and tradition when it comes to women’s 
roles and responsibilities. However, we are also witnessing changing 
attitudes towards ‘western’ education and women’s empowerment with 
people talking of how times are changing, those displaced from rural areas 
having new choices in urban spaces and lack of education seen as a key 
causal factor of conflict. 
 
Beyond Binary Framings: Activism on the Ground 
Women organise in both secular and faith-based organisations. The work 
of Nana Asmau and the jaji live on in groups such as the Federation of 
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Muslim Women’s Associations of Nigeria (FOMWAN) and Muslim Sisters 
Organisations, women’s groups who engage in da'awa and focus on 
women’s rights with campaigns against early and forced marriage, genital 
mutilation, women’s exclusion from education and public life, early 
pregnancy and maternity rights. Christian women mobilise in faith-based 
organisations and are active in churches and in the women’s wing of the 
Christian Association of Nigeria. They challenge narratives around the 
normalisation of VAWG as part of women’s submissiveness in marriage. 
They conceptualise women’s rights within Christian and Islamic 
frameworks which has implications for rights, as discussed below. On the 
other hand, many women working for secular organisations are religious, 
indicating the prevalence of religiosity in northern Nigeria (performative 
and otherwise). The choice of whether to work within a secular or religious 
framework can be as much a matter of strategy and circumstance as 
personal ideology (Nagarajan, 2016a).  
 
Activists work in coalitions of secular organisations, Christian 
organisations, Muslim organisations and interfaith organisations to push 
for women’s rights. They make strategic choices, for example talking about 
the need to be compliant with the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and United Nations 
Security Council Resolution (UNSCR 1325) when talking with interlocutors 
in ministries, departments and agencies, making the case for action on 
VAWG by stressing its incidence and their duty to act with the police and 
faith narratives around violence when talking with religious leaders.  
 
While knowledge of international frameworks may not be high in rural 
areas, women activists in state capitals, depending on to whom advocacy 
and influencing is directed, often use international instruments, Nigerian 
constitutional and other law or religious frameworks. They take different 
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approaches to fundamentalist and conservative interpretations of religion 
when it comes to women’s rights. Many women’s organisations fail to 
challenge the profoundly patriarchal interpretations of culture, religion 
and tradition that abound within binary framings, conceding this point and 
rather talking of needing to move into a new era and discard some of 
culture. Using arguments grounded in contesting interpretations of 
culture, religion and tradition is not enough in itself as prospects for 
change become limited within these frameworks but this is a missed 
opportunity to combat religious fundamentalism and patriarchal 
entrenchment by keeping these spaces and terrain open, particularly given 
‘any agitation for change that does not cloak itself in the rhetoric of ‘Islam’ 
stands almost no chance of gaining any popular support’ (Eltantawi, 2017).  
 
Other women’s organisations, including faith-based organisations, put 
forth interpretations of culture, religion and tradition that promote and 
protect (certain) women’s rights, arguing for example that, 
 
Muslim women in Northern Nigeria, like women in other societies 
across the world, have been subjected to practices that violate 
their rights. Some of these violations are carried out in the name 
of Islam in spite of the fact that such practices are against the 
teachings of Islam’ and ‘striving to protect the rights according to 
women… is one of the obligations imposed by God on all 
members of Muslim societies (Sada et al. 2005, p. 6, 8).  
 
They educate women, judges, policy makers and the general public on 
women’s rights under Islam and encouraging women to access their rights.  
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Adamu (1999, p. 60) writes the difficulties Nigerian Muslim feminists face: 
viewed with suspicion by their own communities and ‘branded as Western 
agents, funded by foreign powers to undermine Islam’ with focus on 
women’s rights seen as ‘a means of diverting attention from the pressing 
economic and political problems facing many members of Muslim 
societies’ in which international economic and political bodies and local 
elites are implicated. This work is done and interpretations put forward 
within the framework of Islam rather than that of international human 
rights and is having some positive impact. According to Suberu (2009), 
strong internal critiques from Muslim civil society organisations have 
moderated controversial aspects. In certain ‘pockets of effectiveness’, 
‘Shari’a institutions appear to facilitate access to justice, to enhance law 
enforcement and even improve the socio-economic position of the most 
poor group of women and widows’ (Mustapha et al., 2018).  
 
An example of some choices made can be seen by the decision to engage 
the hisbah board12 in VAWG prevention and response. I worked with 
women’s rights activists in five northern states between 2013 - 2016 on 
running Observatories on VAWG, platforms for reporting, referrals, 
response and advocacy. They brought together key actors in steering 
committees including government ministries and departments, security 
agencies, human rights and peacebuilding organisations and religious and 
traditional institutions to discuss cases and referrals, look at broader 
trends and determine prevention and response strategies. Members used 
information to push change in institutions. However, this strategy has 
required involvement of actors not known for their support for gender 
equality. For example, a few months after its launch, it was decided to 
invite the hisbah board to join the steering committee in Kano. This 
decision required a lot of work to influence hisbah board members to shift 
attitudes. While known these attempts at attitudinal change would not be 
completely successful, it was agreed to nonetheless include them as they 
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received approximately 1,300 VAWG reports every month as the agency 
closest to and living in communities in Kano (Nagarajan and Nwadinobi, 
2016).  
 
However, the binary outlined above also impacts mobilisations. Many 
women’s rights activists are careful when talking about religion due to 
level of risk and personal beliefs. This hesitancy to challenge constrains 
action. An illustrative example is the way the culture of silence around 
VAWG is reinforced when perpetrators are religious leaders. Women’s 
rights activists have to strategise carefully when it comes to cases of sexual 
violence committed by Islamiyya teachers and imams due to likely risk and 
ensuing uproar. In one particular case, the mother of a girl raped by her 
Islamiyya teacher focused on persuading her husband to move her to 
another Islamiyya school rather than tell him or the community what had 
happened. Activists felt constrained in knowing what to do, beyond 
providing services.  
 
Moreover, divisions in the country along ethno-linguistic and religious 
lines are reflected in group organising and challenges faced. In some 
instances, women create faith-based organisations when services are 
open to all. For example, Christian Women for Excellence and 
Empowerment in Nigerian Society (CWEENS) runs the only shelter in 
Plateau state. They have found resistance among Muslim communities 
due to perceptions they are Christian women seeking to convert Muslims, 
which has made Muslim women wary of seeking help. We also see fault 
lines between and within women’s organisations. They still work and 
mobilise together but there can be some mistrust.  
 
Furthermore, particular issues are not tackled. Despite stringent laws 
around abortion, 13 risks women face procuring abortion14 and personal 
convictions of many activists, particularly those working in sexual and 
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reproductive rights, there is no open mobilisation around the right to 
choose. Not even the high numbers of women and girls abducted by 
armed groups and raped before returning to communities pregnant has 
sparked public debate. Some Muslim women openly discuss having had 
abortions and FOMWAN even released a legal opinion in the wake of these 
abductions that spoke of the permissibility of abortion within certain term 
limits in Islam alongside guidance on not stigmatising the women 
concerned and the children born to them. However, there is no strong 
push by women activists to change the law as it is seen too sensitive for 
Christians.  
 
Attitudes are particularly anti-choice among Christian communities. 
Women’s rights activists who have been known to counsel women, girls 
and their families who want to abort pregnancy that resulted from rape 
against doing so, talking of sanctity of life. Indeed, many women’s rights 
activists are moralistic about sex outside of marriage or between people 
of the same gender. They focus on what women, girls and their families 
can do to keep themselves safe, such as the clothes to (not) wear or not 
allowing girls to engage in street hawking which smacks of victim blaming. 
That displaced girls engage in survival sex with men in power is seen as 
wrong not just due to unequal power dynamics and exploitation but also 
as it constitutes sex outside marriage and will affect future marriageability.  
 
Many women’s rights activists in Nigeria are also profoundly homophobic 
and transphobic. I have facilitated VAWG workshops where activists have 
labelled lesbianism as a form of violence, spoken of homosexuality as 
synonymous with paedophilia and talked of the need to address ‘sexual 
initiation practices’ of ‘lesbian cults.’ Reports of increasing cases of 
‘lesbianism’ in IDP camps are seen as symbolic of the immorality to which 
people have degenerated. Referral services are likely to be staffed with 
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people of discriminatory attitudes and queer women need to be warned 
to be selective about details they reveal (Mohammed et al., 2018). Of 
course, not all women’s rights activists in northern Nigeria feel this way, 
but it seems to be a dominant attitude and there is little to no solidarity 
and alliance building between women’s rights and queer movements.  
 
These dynamics highlight another binary: between issues such as sexual 
violence against young girls, early and forced marriage and education 
where there has been some progress (Nagaraian and Nwadinobi, 2016; 
Eltantawi, 2016) and issues around sexuality, abortion and people of non-
normative sexual orientations, gender identities and gender expressions. 
While ‘sexual violence and abuse against girls (and boys) is being regularly 
condemned, there is an acceptance that this happens in ‘our’ communities 
and parents and guardians are increasingly coming forward to report 
despite the fear that still persists around doing so,’ reported VAWG cases 
are overwhelmingly those of minors with people less likely to report when 
survivors are adult women or when perpetrators are partners (Nagarajan 
and Nwadinobi, 2016). This is unsurprising given attitudes around intimate 
partner violence and marital rape and the victim blaming adult women 
experience for their dressing, behaviour and even deciding to have sex for 
money and food when all livelihood sources are lost. Limited progress 
made around women’s rights is still on ‘easy’ issues with girls who provoke 
empathy. Many women’s rights activists, whose analysis and mobilising 
does not necessarily equate to feminist activism are unable, unwilling or 
wary to challenge beyond a certain limit, thereby reflecting the regressive 
nature of dominant thinking in society as a whole as well as the influence 
of this binary on women’s rights organising. 
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Conclusion 
I have sought to define the binary between culture/religion/tradition and 
modern/secular/foreign, showing its historical roots and developments 
and ways these are grounded in struggles against corruption and injustice.  
 
The binary first noticeably emerged during the Sokoto Caliphate when 
‘universal’ Islamic practices and values were set against a plurality of 
Islamic interpretations, syncretic practices and more indigenous belief 
systems and links between governance according to Islamic law, morality 
and effective and just rule as opposed to the corruption of the Hausa 
rulers, seen as ‘inauthentic’ and self-centred Muslims developed.  
 
Conquest and colonisation by the British brought about social if not 
administrative rupture with populations struggling to understand defeat 
by Christians and believing governance structures had become corrupted 
due to foreign influence. Post-independence, increasing religious 
intolerance, fundamentalism and sectarian violence further attacked the 
idea of diversity of religious interpretations. The binary framing deepened 
with democratic transition with democracy, secularism and the corrupt 
nature of Nigerian politics seen as inextricably linked and in opposition to 
just, moral and effective Islamic governance. Shari’a code implementation 
failed to bring about the transformative change addressing poverty, 
inequality, corruption, injustice and ineffective governance for which 
people were agitating. Its ‘success’ rather became tied up with religious 
performativity and policing of ‘immorality’ with women’s bodies the 
demonstration of effectiveness. 
  
I have interrogated the dissonance of such binaries with past and present 
lived realities pointing to women having influence and occupying positions 
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of power throughout history, lived cultural sexual practices between 
heterosexual people, the existence of non-normative sexual orientations 
and gender identities and current gender roles. Despite this dichotomy 
between binary framings and historical and current realities, the binary 
continues to have weight. While women activists mobilise using both 
religious and human rights frameworks and are able to come together in 
coalitions to achieve some success, the progress made tends to be limited 
by binary framings and on issues with empathisable victims such as the 
rape of young girls. However, the silence around VAWG generally is 
magnified when it comes to matters close to religion, some issues such as 
abortion are not the focus of mobilisation and many activists can take 
profoundly anti-feminist stances through engaging in victim blaming, 
policing of women’s and girls’ sexualities and perpetuating discrimination 
against those of non-normative sexual orientations, gender identities and 
gender expressions. Yet even here, mobilising occurs outside these binary 
framing with varying levels of success, with women’s rights activists 
working for secular and faith-based organisations coming together and 
deploying a range of strategies.  
 
It is also important to acknowledge that gender discussions take place 
outside these frameworks. Social media is used to challenge and interact 
with those in power and change narratives and norms. Although online 
spaces are limited in terms of access for the most marginalised women and 
they can be sites of violence with women publicly shamed and harassed, 
activists use new technology and social media and traditional media such 
as radio to drive forward conversations. Women share experiences of 
marginalisation and violence on Twitter using hashtags such as 
#BeingFemaleInNigeria. Female in Nigeria, a Facebook group, enables 
women to tell stories in a non-judgmental space and be linked to support. 
#BringBackOurGirls was a worldwide phenomenon leading to protests 
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across the world. During many of these conversations, religious arguments 
are ignored or sidelined.  
 
Moreover, while the binary posits rights discourse as linked to democracy 
that has proved inherently corrupt in contrast with just and effective 
Islamic governance, people themselves clamour for rights. The rights 
discourse still resonates with many and the binaristic approach has not 
been successful in winning over a significant proportion of the population, 
particularly those who are marginalised. The desire to combat early and 
forced marriage is present across the ideological spectrum in northern 
Nigeria with even some Islamist activists conceding it is a result of poverty, 
ignorance and incorrect understanding of Islam and women at the 
forefront of fighting this practice despite negative reactions from some 
Islamist forces (Eltantawi, 2016). Furthermore, Muslims, including 
religious leaders, across northern Nigeria are hungry for education for 
themselves and their children, pursuing both Islamic and ‘western’ 
education (Ostien, 2018) as they see it as needed for personal and 
community development and growth (Nagarajan, 2016a). Change is 
starkest in northeast Nigeria where conflict has led to fundamental 
societal rupture and attitudinal change. That women and girls have been 
left with the burden of providing for their families and communities and 
with decision making power, has fundamentally shifted gender roles and 
is starting to change gender norms. Despite protests of religious and other 
community leaders who are unhappy about these changes in gender roles, 
many women desire education and opportunities for their daughters, 
pointing to their own inability to earn decent incomes due to lack of 
education and wanting their girls to be more self-sufficient and less likely 
to experience these same hardships.  
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Women’s rights activists would do well to build on these opportunities by 
utilising a range of strategies and approaches. As well as challenging the 
profoundly patriarchal interpretations of culture, religion and tradition 
that abound within binary framings externally, activists need to do internal 
movement work to centre feminist analyses, particularly around sexuality 
and sexual and reproductive rights, and link and work in solidarity with 
other movements. Focus should also be on facilitating discussion of how 
gender roles are changing and helping individuals, families and 
communities to adapt to new realities hence mitigating likely backlash 
while expanding and challenging gender norms.  
 
Chitra Nagarajan is an activist, researcher and writer who has spent the 
last 15 years working on human rights and peace building and involved in 
feminist, anti-racist, anti-fundamentalist and queer movements. She 
currently lives and works in Maiduguri, focusing on conflict mitigation, 
civilian protection, human rights (particularly those of women and girls) 
and building peace. She has previously worked to promote and protect 
human rights and build peace in China, Guinea, Liberia, Sierra Leone, the 
United Kingdom and the United States. Her book She Called Me Woman: 
Nigeria’s Queer Women Speak, co-edited with Azeenarh Mohammed and 
Rafeeat Aliyu and published by Cassava Republic Press, is a collection of 
narratives that paints a vivid portrait of what it means to be a queer 
Nigerian woman. 
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Notes  
1 The author thanks Fatimah Kelleher, Ayesha Khan, Nida Kirmani, Mariz Tadros and the 
anonymous reviewer for their useful comments on earlier drafts. 
2 I used the term religious fundamentalism as distinct from religious conservatism and to 
signify the project whereby those engaged in it ‘construct ‘tradition’ in a way that is 
highly selective, at the same time as dogmatically insisting that their reconstructions of 
text are ‘sacred’ and so unable to be questioned’ (Cowden and Sahgal 2017, p. 15), deny 
‘the possibility of interpretation and reinterpretation even while its adherents engage in 
both’ (Bennoune 2013, p. 16) and centre the importance of control of women’s bodies 
and sexuality and rigid gender roles. Religious fundamentalists ‘believe in the imposition 
of God’s law, something called the Shari’a – their version of it rather than others’ – on 
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Muslims everywhere and in the creation of what they deem to be Islamic states or 
disciplined diasporic communities ruled by these laws,’ denounce secularists, seek to 
bring politicised religion into all spheres, want to police, judge and change the 
behaviour, appearance and comportment of others and aim to sharply limit women’s 
rights, sometimes in the name of protection, respect and difference (Bennoune 2013, p. 
16). In contrast, while religious conservatism remains problematic, it does not make 
claims to possessing the only true interpretation and can be ‘protective of certain 
traditional spaces for women as well as being capable of reform and change’ (Cowden 
and Sahgal 2017, p. 18). 
3 This system of indirect rule in northern Nigeria differed from the approach used in 
much of the south with this difference in the colonial project creating a division within 
Nigeria that still echoes today. 
4 There is today a large body of ‘neutral’ Muslims who, wary of sectarian contestation 
and turmoil, shun affiliation (Mustapha 2015, p. 4) with as many as 44 per cent of 
Muslims surveyed in 2010 seeing themselves as ‘just Muslim.’ 
5 The word ‘Shari’a’ is used in political, popular and media discourse as fixed, immutable 
and with one correct interpretation deliberately obscuring the existence and practice of 
interpretation. This paper will use ‘Shari’a codes’ to refer to laws passed and ‘Shari’a’ to 
refer to the concept, such as the people’s desire for Shari’a, and when giving the names 
of the bodies that were created. 
6 Zina connotes ‘illegal’ sexual activity i.e. any form of consensual sexual relations 
between a man and a woman who are not married to one another. Offences are 
referred to as fornication or adultery, depending on marital status.  
7 For example, in the cases of Amina Lawal and Safiya Hussaini, who were sentenced to 
death by stoning in 2002 for zina, the men involved were set free due to lack of 
evidence. The women’s rights organisation Women’s Rights Advancement and 
Protection Alternative (WRAPA), supported by Baobab for Human Rights and other 
organisations, mobilised legal defence and both women were subsequently acquitted on 
appeal. 
8 At the same time as the state is relinquishing its responsibility to provide for those 
living in it, coercive control has been increasing, in reaction to perceptions of growing 
power and civic education across the country. The Same Sex Marriage (Prohibition) Act 
of 2014 criminalises the registration and operation of, participation in and support for 
gay clubs, societies and organisations. A Bill Prohibiting Frivolous Petitions, popularly 
known as the Social Media Bill, designed to regulate communications and use of the 
social media, was successfully resisted by civil society in May 2016. A Non-Government 
Organisations Regulatory Commission of Nigeria (Establishment) Bill, which has been 
said by civil society organisations to threaten the independence of NGOs and CSOs in 
Nigeria, is currently in the House of Representatives. 
9 For example, there have been examples of ‘traditional’ leaders that, as a result of this 
work, have decided to expand their council of advisers to include women so they can be 
aware of and responsive to women’s concerns (Nagarajan, 2017). 
10 In the interests of conflict sensitivity, this article will use the exact names of groups as 
opposed to using the blanket term ‘Boko Haram’ which, rather than being the name of 
groups, is one ascribed by the media and serves to simplify message and aims. 
11 Mustapha defines vertical inequality as inequality between individuals and horizontal 
inequality as inequality between groups and regions. 
12 Following the introduction of Shari’a codes, the hisbah board, a force charged with 
upholding morality was set up formally by the state or informally by communities in 
many states where Shari’a codes had been passed. While there are many accusations 
against the hisbah, including for violation of privacy, seizure of property, targeting non-
Muslims and harassment of political enemies of state governors, the hisbah are a major 
service provider, particularly of arbitration and dispute resolution for the poor: 
(Mustapha and Gamawa, 2018). 
13 Although post abortion care is allowed, providing or procuring an abortion itself is a 
criminal act except if the mother’s life is at risk. 
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14 It is freely available, including in medical clinics, for those with money while poorer 
women are blocked from access to safe abortion. 
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